The democracy indicator used by the political instability task force and described in Goldstone, Jack, Robert Bates, David Epstein, Ted Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2010. A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability. American Journal of Political Science 54 (1): 190-208. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x and in Taylor, Sean J. and Ulfelder, Jay, A Measurement Error Model of Dichotomous Democracy Status (May 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726962 or doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2726962 . This is derived from the Polity dataset (pitf uses version 5; pitf_p4 uses PolityIV updated to 2018).

pitf

pitf_p4

Format

An object of class tbl_df (inherits from tbl, data.frame) with 16582 rows and 13 columns.

An object of class tbl_df (inherits from tbl, data.frame) with 16581 rows and 13 columns.

Variables

pitf_country

The original country name in the Polity dataset.

pitf_ccode

The ccode variable in the polity dataset. Should be identical to cown.

year

The calendar year.

exrec

The polity "executive recruitment" variable. Can be: 1 = Ascription

2 = Dual Executive (Designation)

3 = Designation

4 = Self-Selection

5 = Gradual Transition from Self-Selection Dual Executive (Election)

6 = Transitional or Restricted Election

7 = Competitive Election.

See the polity codebook for more details.

parcomp

The polity "competitiveness of participation" variable. See the polity codebook for more details. Here's what the codebook says:

The Competitiveness of Participation: The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated (1) on Regulation of Participation (PARREG, variable 2.5) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between Unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.5 also are not coded on variable 2.6. Competitiveness is coded on a five category scale:

(0) Not Applicable: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable 2.6).

(1) Repressed: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.

(2) Suppressed: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20 percent or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10 percent of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:

i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).

ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).

iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for either Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups. Note 3.6: A newly enacted right to engage in political activities is most likely a change from category 1 to 2.

(3) Factional: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.

(4) Transitional: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted, Suppressed, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.

(5) Competitive: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

By combining scores on Regulation of Political Participation (variable 3.5) and the Competitiveness of Participation (variable 3.6), a relatively detailed picture of the extent of political competition and opposition emerges.

pitf

A five category indicator of democracy described in Goldstone et al 2010. Can be:

0-Full autocracy (exrec < 7, parcomp !=0 and parcomp < 3)

1-Partial autocracy (exrec < 7, parcomp = 0 or parcomp > 2)

2-Partial democracy with factionalism (exrec > 6, parcomp = 3)

3-Partial democracy (exrec > 6, parcomp = 0 or parcomp = 4 or parcomp = 5 but exrec != 8)

4-Full democracy (exrec = 8, parcomp = 5). See Goldstone et al. 2010 for full details.

pitf_binary

A simplification of the pitf indicator of democracy described in Taylor, Sean J. and Ulfelder, Jay, A Measurement Error Model of Dichotomous Democracy Status (May 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726962 or doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2726962 . A country is a democracy (1) "if its chief executive is chosen in competitive elections (EXREC equal to 7 or 8) and political competition is not suppressed (PARCOMP equal to 0 or PARCOMP greater than 2)" Otherwise it is a non-democracy (0).

Standard descriptive variables (generated by this package)

extended_country_name

The name of the country in the Gleditsch-Ward system of states, or the official name of the entity (for non-sovereign entities and states not in the Gleditsch and Ward system of states) or else a common name for disputed cases that do not have an official name (e.g., Western Sahara, Hyderabad). The Gleditsch and Ward scheme sometimes indicates the common name of the country and (in parentheses) the name of an earlier incarnation of the state: thus, they have Germany (Prussia), Russia (Soviet Union), Madagascar (Malagasy), etc. For details, see Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816." International Interactions 25: 393-413. The list can be found at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html.

GWn

Gleditsch and Ward's numeric country code, from the Gleditsch and Ward list of independent states.

cown

The Correlates of War numeric country code, 2016 version. This differs from Gleditsch and Ward's numeric country code in a few cases. See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership for the full list.

in_GW_system

Whether the state is "in system" (that is, is independent and sovereign), according to Gleditsch and Ward, for this particular date. Matches at the end of the year; so, for example South Vietnam 1975 is FALSE because, according to Gleditsch and Ward, the country ended on April 1975 (being absorbed by North Vietnam). It is also TRUE for dates beyond 2012 for countries that did not end by then, depsite the fact that the Gleditsch and Ward list has not been updated since.

References

Goldstone, Jack, Robert Bates, David Epstein, Ted Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2010. A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability. American Journal of Political Science 54 (1): 190-208. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x

Taylor, Sean J. and Ulfelder, Jay, A Measurement Error Model of Dichotomous Democracy Status (May 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726962 or doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2726962