A dataset containing the country-year version of the democracy classification described in Doorenspleet, Renske. 2000. Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization. World Politics 52 (03): 384-406. DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100016580. doi: 10.1017/S0043887100016580 .



An object of class tbl_df (inherits from tbl, data.frame) with 13877 rows and 10 columns.


Doorenspleet, Renske. 2000. Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization. World Politics 52 (03): 384-406. doi: 10.1017/S0043887100016580 .



Country name as in Doorenspleet.


Regime type: A = Authoritarian, D = Democracy, I = interruption.

Doorenspleet notes that the classification of democracy depends on two things (pp. 391-392 of the article):

The first requirement of minimal democracies, the presence of competition, can be seen to be met if there exist institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies at the national level and if there are institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Indicators of these phenomena have already been collated in Gurr's well-known Polity III data set, which covers most independent countries on an annual basis from 1800 to 1994; it is therefore an ideal source to measure the presence of competition.21 Moreover, these data are also easily adapted to the definition of competition employed in this analysis. In operational terms, I will consider a national political system to be competitive if there is at least one executive chosen by competitive popular elections (if Gurr's indicator "competitiveness of executive recruitment" is coded 3 or 4); if all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain an executive position through a regularized process (if Gurr's indicator "openness of executive recruitment" is coded 3 or 4); if alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena, such that oppositional activity is not restricted or suppressed (if Gurr's indicator "competitiveness of participation" is coded 0, 3, 4, 5); and if there are at least substantial limitations on the exercise of executive power (if Gurr's indicator "constraints on the power of the chief executive" is coded 4, 5, 6, or 7).

The second requirement of minimal democracies is that there be inclusive, universal suffrage at the national level. The norm of universality requires that all citizens of the state--without regard to sex, race, language, descent, income, land holdings, education, or religious beliefs--formally enjoy the right to vote and to be elected to public office. The fact that certain prerequisites are demanded, such as a minimum age, a sound mind, or the absence of criminal record, does not negate this principle. Only countries that at some stage meet the first requirement of competition from 1800 to 1994 are considered when measuring the inclusiveness of the system. Levels of inclusiveness of the political system may be broken down into one of the following four categories: (1) no popular suffrage; (2) suffrage denied to large segments of the population (more than 20 percent is excluded); (3) suffrage with partial restrictions (less than 20 percent of the population is excluded);(4) universal suffrage or minor restrictions. For the purposes of this analysis, countries are considered "sufficiently" inclusive to meet the criterion of a minimal democracy if they fall into the third or fourth category. Should they fall within either of the first two categories or should they not meet the competition criterion, they are classified as authoritarian regimes. Reliable data on inclusiveness are of course difficult to obtain and to standardize, and I have had to rely on historical sources and various monographs for each country, as well as on Keesing's Record of World Events and many of the standard handbooks and almanacs. The appendix gives an overview of the years in which political systems can be considered as both competitive and inclusive and hence are classified in this study as "minimal democracies."

(This description suggests one could replicate Doorenspleet's measure using data from PIPE or LIED as well as the newest version of polity; Doorenspleet uses Polity III data)


Regime type: 1 = Authoritarian, 2 = Democracy, interruption codes as NA.


Year. Regimes are coded as of the 31 Dec of the year.


First year of the regime.


Last year of the regime.

Standard descriptive variables (generated by this package)


The name of the country in the Gleditsch-Ward system of states, or the official name of the entity (for non-sovereign entities and states not in the Gleditsch and Ward system of states) or else a common name for disputed cases that do not have an official name (e.g., Western Sahara, Hyderabad). The Gleditsch and Ward scheme sometimes indicates the common name of the country and (in parentheses) the name of an earlier incarnation of the state: thus, they have Germany (Prussia), Russia (Soviet Union), Madagascar (Malagasy), etc. For details, see Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816." International Interactions 25: 393-413. The list can be found at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html.


Gleditsch and Ward's numeric country code, from the Gleditsch and Ward list of independent states.


The Correlates of War numeric country code, 2016 version. This differs from Gleditsch and Ward's numeric country code in a few cases. See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership for the full list.


Whether the state is "in system" (that is, is independent and sovereign), according to Gleditsch and Ward, for this particular date. Matches at the end of the year; so, for example South Vietnam 1975 is FALSE because, according to Gleditsch and Ward, the country ended on April 1975 (being absorbed by North Vietnam). It is also TRUE for dates beyond 2012 for countries that did not end by then, depsite the fact that the Gleditsch and Ward list has not been updated since.